This paper explores the realm of infinite horizon average reward Constrained Markov Decision Processes (CMDPs).

We consider a variant of continuous-state partially-observable stochastic games with neural perception mechanisms and an asymmetric information structure. One agent has partial information, with the observation function implemented as a neural network, while the other agent is assumed to have full knowledge of the state. We present, for the first time, an efficient online method to compute an $\varepsilon$-minimax strategy profile, which requires only one linear program to be solved for each agent at every stage, instead of a complex estimation of opponent counterfactual values. For the partially-informed agent, we propose a continual resolving approach which uses lower bounds, pre-computed offline with heuristic search value iteration (HSVI), instead of opponent counterfactual values. This inherits the soundness of continual resolving at the cost of pre-computing the bound. For the fully-informed agent, we propose an inferred-belief strategy, where the agent maintains an inferred belief about the belief of the partially-informed agent based on (offline) upper bounds from HSVI, guaranteeing $\varepsilon$-distance to the value of the game at the initial belief known to both agents.

In multiagent systems, agents often have to rely on other agents to reach their goals, for example when they lack a needed resource or do not have the capability to perform a required action. Agents therefore need to cooperate. Then, some of the questions raised are: Which agent(s) to cooperate with? What are the potential coalitions in which agents can achieve their goals? As the number of possibilities is potentially quite large, how to automate the process? And then, how to select the most appropriate coalition, taking into account the uncertainty in the agents' abilities to carry out certain tasks? In this article, we address the question of how to find and evaluate coalitions among agents in multiagent systems using MCS tools, while taking into consideration the uncertainty around the agents' actions. Our methodology is the following: We first compute the solution space for the formation of coalitions using a contextual reasoning approach. Second, we model agents as contexts in Multi-Context Systems (MCS), and dependence relations among agents seeking to achieve their goals, as bridge rules. Third, we systematically compute all potential coalitions using algorithms for MCS equilibria, and given a set of functional and non-functional requirements, we propose ways to select the best solutions. Finally, in order to handle the uncertainty in the agents' actions, we extend our approach with features of possibilistic reasoning. We illustrate our approach with an example from robotics.